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ABSTRACT
To a remarkable degree, European courts have come to recognize that
human rights include environmental rights—a development in
jurisprudence that remains little known in the United States and in many
other countries. A substantial body of transnational court decisions has
dramatically expanded the scope of human rights, offering the
protections of international law against environmental harms. This
Article will describe the decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights over the past two decades (including the factual backgrounds of
the cases, which are essential to understand the rulings), suggest some
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areas for further research, and describe some problems that have yet to
be thoroughly addressed. We suggest that courts around the world
should pay attention to these developments and argue that, within
Europe, national courts should pay closer attention to the environmental
principles enunciated by the European Court of Human Rights. By doing
so, national courts will ensure recognition of these principles as an
integral part of their national jurisprudence. Lawyers can play a role in
advancing these goals through the use of strategic litigation.
I. THE ENVIRONMENTAL EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
For more than a decade, ruing the lack of an explicit environmental right, the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (“Assembly”) has urged that
1
Europeans should have an enforceable right to a healthy environment. The
Assembly has recommended several times that the Council’s Committee of
Ministers “draw up an additional protocol to the European Convention on Human
2
Rights, recognising the right to a healthy and viable environment.” Each time,
however, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has rejected this
3
plea—most recently in 2010. Trying again in 2011, the Parliamentary Assembly
urged “the importance of securing . . . the right to a healthy environment, as one
4
of the fundamental social rights directly related to the right to life.” The plea has
fallen on deaf political ears.
Judicial ears have not been so deaf. Although in 1976 the European
Commission on Human Rights (an institution that no longer exists) dismissed a
claim to an environmental right based on the right to life as being a “manifestly
5
unfounded” legal argument, by the 1980s and 1990s both the Commission and
1. Eur. Parl. Ass., Drafting an Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights
Concerning the Right to a Healthy Environment, Doc. No. 12003 (2009), available at http://assembly.
coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc09/EDOC12003.pdf. Previously the Parliamentary Assembly officially
recommended the “human right to a healthy and clean environment” in the European Convention and made
reference to this and other human rights approaches to environmental issues in PA Recommendations 1130
(1990), 1431 (1999) and 1614 (2003). The Committee of Ministers denied all three attempts. See Regional
Treaties and Legal Provisions, RIGHT TO ENV’T, http://www.righttoenvironment. org/default.asp?pid=82 (last
visited Mar. 18, 2012). Note: Citations in footnotes have been checked and rewritten by the editorial staff of the
law journal, which takes responsibility for their style and accuracy.
2. See, e.g., Eur. Parl. Ass, Drafting an Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human
Rights Concerning the Right to a Healthy Environment, 32d Sess., Recommendation 1885 (2009), available at
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta09/EREC1885.htm.
3. Eur. Parl. Ass., Reply from the Committee of Ministers, 27th Sess., Doc. No. 12298 (2010), available
at http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/workingdocs/doc10/edoc12298.htm.
4. Eur. Parl. Ass., The Role of Parliaments in the Consolidation and Development of Social Rights in
Europe, Doc. No. 12632 (2011), available at http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/Working
Docs/Doc11/EDOC12632.htm.
5. X & Y v. Fed. Rep. of Germany, App. No. 7407/76, 5 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 161, 162
(1976) (rejecting assertion that military activity in a marshland violated such a claimed right to a safe
environment).
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the European Court of Human Rights were interpreting the European Convention
6
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the main
human rights treaty for Europe, hereinafter referred to as the European
7
Convention) to apply to environmental degradation.
A. The Convention and the Court
The European Convention says nothing explicitly about the environment.
The atrocities committed by Nazi Germany and the rise of communism in the
8
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe led to its adoption in 1950, while
environmental problems were not at the forefront of consciousness. In the hands
of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR” or “the Court”), however, the
European Convention has come to be seen as the last resort for the powerless
whose health is affected by environmental pollution. This is because the Court
has derived environmental rights from traditional fundamental rights for nearly
two decades.
Despite the lack of an explicitly enumerated right to a healthy environment in
9
the European Convention, other rights that are recognized therein have been
used to grant remedies in the case of environmental harm. Most ECHR
environmental cases have interpreted Article 8—the right to privacy and family
life—as a legal basis for stopping pollution or degradation of the environment or
awarding compensation where pollution or degradation have occurred. Other
10
cases have used Article 2—the right to life.
The European Convention has been ratified by all forty-seven nations that are
members of the Council of Europe, a body whose membership extends from the
11
Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean and from the North Sea to the Mediterranean.
6. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Basic+Texts/The+Convention+and+
additional+protocols/The+European+Convention+on+Human+Rights/ [hereinafter European Convention on
Human Rights].
7. See infra text accompanying notes 24-55.
8. At a meeting of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1949, the Committee on Legal
and Administrative Questions drew up a report that became the foundation for the Convention. Eur. Consult.
Ass., Measures for the Fulfilment of the Declared Aim of the Council of Europe, 1st Sess., Doc. No. 77 (1949),
available at http://assembly.coe.int/Conferences/2009Anniversaire49/DocRef/Teitgen6.pdf. The chair of the
committee, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, had been a prosecutor at the Nuremburg Trials for Nazi war criminals.
The first proposals for the Convention “were for a type of European collective pact against totalitarianism.” ED
BATES, THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 45-49 (2010).
9. Tătar v. Romania, App. No. 67021/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Jan. 27, 2009), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search Tătar v. Romania under Case Title)
(recognizing the right to enjoy a healthy and protected environment in a sort of obiter dictum). See discussion
infra Part I.B.2.(d) and note 200.
10. Cases using Articles 6 (fair trial) and 10 (right of information) are beyond the scope of this article.
11. For members of the Council of Europe, see Navigate by Country, COUNCIL EUR.,
http://www.coe.int/lportal/web/coe-portal/home/country (last visited Mar. 19, 2012). The region encompassed
by the Council of Europe should not be confused with the region comprising the European Union. While
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Because these countries have accepted the European Convention, they have also
subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the ECHR. The ECHR accepts
applications alleging human rights violations brought by individuals against
12
States. When the ECHR finds a breach of the rights enshrined in the
13
Convention, it grants “just satisfaction,” obliging the government at issue to
adopt measures to remedy the applicant’s individual situation.
In some respects, a treaty protecting human rights should be considered like a
constitution—a document that expresses a society’s fundamental principles and
whose application is not confined to solving the specific problems that originally
gave rise to its adoption. This is what has happened with the European
Convention in the hands of the ECHR. Indeed, the Court has even declared the
European Convention to be a “constitutional instrument of European public
14
order.” It has further recognized the Convention to be a “living instrument
15
which . . . must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions.” The
Directorate General of Human Rights of the Council of Europe has pointed out
that the Court applies Article 8 (as it does other Articles) “on a case-by-case basis

publicity and habit among Americans and Western Europeans may treat the twenty-seven nations who are
members of the European Union as “Europe,” the EU covers only the western half of Europe. The European
continent is considered by many to extend from the Atlantic at least to the Ural Mountains in Russia. French
President Charles de Gaulle stated as much in 1962 and on other occasions, causing much consternation in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, as it was interpreted to suggest a desire to break up the Soviet
Union, more than half of which was in Asia. Yuri Dubinin, About a ‘Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals',
RUSS. GLOBAL AFF. (Nov. 17, 2007), http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_9784. Indeed, as far back as 1887, a
large stone marker was erected by geographers from the Austro-Hungarian Empire at what they calculated to be
the “center of Europe.” Its location is in western Ukraine, to the east of the EU, and it contains this inscription
in Latin from 1887: “Locus Perennis Dilicentissime cum libella librationis quae est in Austria et Hungaria
confecta cum mensura gradum meridionalium et paralleloumierum Europeum . . . MDCCCLXXXVII.” See The
Centre of Europe, RAKHIV, http://www.rakhiv.com/index_en.php?page=CenterOfEurope&lang=en (last visited
Mar. 19, 2012).
12. By way of comparison, cases can be brought before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights only
by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, not by individuals. American Convention on Human
Rights art. 61, Nov. 21, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143. When the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms was first adopted in 1950 (came into force in 1953), it created the European
Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. This is discussed in Eur. Consult.
Ass., Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby: Explanatory Report, ETS 155 (1994), available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/reports/html/155.htm. Cases involving citizens could be brought to the Court
only by the Commission. Id. In 1998, Protocol 11 abolished the Commission, resulting in cases being filed
directly in the Court by citizens throughout Europe. Eur. Consult. Ass., Steering Committee for Human Rights
(CDDH) Explanatory Report to the [draft] Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Amending the Control System of the Convention, 114th Sess., Doc. No. CM
(2004) 65, available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=739765. See also European Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 6, at art. 34.
13. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6, at art. 41.
14. Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27 (1995). These words were, of course, obiter
dicta.
15. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1978).
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16

while giving the concepts an autonomous Convention meaning.” This
“flexibility” means that the meaning of the European Convention “is capable of
17
evolving” and has “the potential to embrace a wide variety of matters.”
B. Article 8—Right to Private and Family Life
Most of the jurisprudence involving environmental matters has developed
under Article 8 of the European Convention, Section 1 of which reads:
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
18
his correspondence.”
At first glance, this language does not appear to involve environmental harms
at all. What is a person’s “private and family life?” How can harm to the
environment be seen as a lack of “respect” for that life? How can “respect for . . .
his home” translate into enforceable protections against pollution? Does this
Article protect against infringements by private parties, by governmental bodies,
or both? Do noisy fireworks show a lack of “respect” for private life? If a
governmental body fails to give information to residents of a nearby danger, does
that constitute a remediable violation of the Convention? Does a lack of
participation in governmental decision-making constitute a lack of such respect?
Many early cases in the ECHR interpreting the “privacy” prong of Article 8
focused on intensely personal matters, such as the relationship between an
19
unmarried mother and her child, a demand that a prisoner be subjected to blood
20
tests, or arguments over parental visitation rights with children born as a result
21
of an extra-marital or adulterous affair. Cases interpreting the “home” prong
22
have largely involved questions of search and seizure. Beginning in 1994,
however, environmental harm has been recognized as having the potential to

16. URSULA KILKELLY, HUMAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK, NO. 1, THE RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND
FAMILY LIFE: A GUIDE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 10 (2001).
17. Id. at 10-11.
18. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=005&CL=ENG
[hereinafter “Convention” or “European Convention”]. Section 2 of Article 8 further provides:
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security,
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Id. (emphasis added).
19. Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at 8 (1979).
20. X. v. Austria, App. No. 8278/78, 18 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 154 (1979) (blood test).
21. Jolie & Lebrun v. Belgium., App. No. 11418/85, 47 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 243 (1986).
22. See, e.g., Smirnov v. Russia, App. No. 71362/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 49 (Nov. 12, 2007),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search Smirnov v. Russia under Case Title)
(giving police unfettered discretion in searches violates Article 8).
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violate Article 8. This recognition has since encompassed noise pollution, air
pollution, water pollution, and other matters.
In addition to the recognition of a substantive right to be protected against
pollution under Article 8, the Court has developed a jurisprudence of procedural
protections that include recognition of a positive duty of governments to provide
information and analysis to citizens and a right of citizens to challenge
governmental decisions in the courts.
1. A Substantive Environmental Right
a. The Seed of an Environmental Right: López Ostra v. Spain (1994)
As long ago as the early 1980s, litigants attempted to use Article 8 as the
24
basis for an environmental right. In Arrondelle v. U.K. —a case that involved
noise pollution as a result of the operation of Heathrow Airport in London—after
Article 8 was raised, the parties reached a so-called “friendly settlement” that
removed the matter from being the subject of a ruling by the European Court.
Later, in Powell and Rayner v. United Kingdom, an applicant raised an Article 8
argument in a case decided in 1990, but the Court did not find a violation. The
Court in that case did state that “the quality of the applicant’s private life and the
scope for enjoying the amenities of his home have been adversely affected by the
25
noise generated by aircraft.” The Court concluded, “Article 8 (art. 8) is
26
therefore a material provision . . . .” However, despite the applicability of
section 1 of Article 8, the Court concluded that “there is no serious ground for
maintaining that either the policy approach to the problem or the content of the
particular regulatory measures adopted by the United Kingdom authorities gives
rise to violation of Article 8 (art. 8)” and “the United Kingdom Government
cannot arguably be said to have exceeded the margin of appreciation afforded to
27
them or upset the fair balance required to be struck under Article 8 (art. 8).” The
Grand Chamber of the Court handed down a similar ruling in 2003, also
28
involving Heathrow Airport in London, but awarded compensation to the
29
applicants.
The first case to hold clearly that the European Convention on Human Rights
30
includes environmental rights was the 1994 case, López Ostra v. Spain. Mrs.
Gregoria López Ostra lived in a town called Lorca, in the Murcia region of Spain.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

López Ostra v. Spain, 303 Eur. Ct. H.R. 41 (1994).
Arrondelle v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7889/77, 26 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 5 (1982).
Powell & Rayner v. United Kingdom, 172 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1990).
Id.
Id. at 19-20.
Hatton v. United Kingdom, 2003-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 191.
See infra text accompanying note 68.
López Ostra v. Spain, 303 Eur. Ct. H.R. 41 (1994).
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She and her family—her husband and their two daughters—lived a few hundred
meters from a heavy concentration of leather manufacturing facilities. Several
tanneries belonging to a company called SACURSA had a plant, built with a
State subsidy, for the treatment of liquid and solid waste; it was located about
twelve meters from the applicant’s home. The plant began to operate in 1988
without the license required by regulations on activities classified as causing
nuisance and being unhealthy, noxious, and dangerous for health. Contamination
of air that resulted from the plant’s operation caused health problems and
nuisance to many Lorca people, particularly those living in the area close to
31
tanneries.
Following numerous complaints and in the light of reports from health
authorities and the Environment and Nature Agency for the Murcia region, the
town council ordered cessation of one of the plant’s activities. They permitted the
32
treatment of wastewater contaminated with chromium to continue, however. In
33
response to the decision, Mrs. López Ostra filed suit in local court, as her two
34
sisters-in-law did later.
Among other evidence, the Ministry of Justice’s Institute of Forensic
Medicine “indicated that gas concentrations in houses near the plant exceeded the
35
permitted limit.” It noted that the applicant’s daughter, Cristina, and her
nephew, Fernando López, “presented typical symptoms of chronic absorption of
gas, symptoms that periodically manifested themselves in the form of acute
36
broncho-pulmonary infections.” It believed, based on the evidence, that there
was a relationship between the children’s disease and the levels of gas. Also,
according to pediatricians, Cristina’s diagnosis showed that she experienced
“nausea, vomiting, allergic reactions, anorexia, etc., which could only be
37
explained by the fact that she was living in a highly polluted area.”
The rights recognized by the European Convention are mirrored in the
38
Spanish Constitution, but various Spanish courts rejected Mrs. López Ostra’s
rights-based arguments. The Supreme Court of Spain ruled that there was no

31. Id. at 43. Note: in this and several other paragraphs, for purposes of readability, the authors have
chosen not to place quotation marks around some words taken directly from court opinions, while citing to the
source paragraphs in the opinions.
32. Id. at 43-44.
33. Id. at 44.
34. Id. at 46.
35. Id. at 47.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 27, 1978, §§ 15, 17-19 (Spain), available at
http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Hist_Normas/Norm/const_espa_texto_ingles_0.
pdf. Excerpts of the sections can be found in López Ostra, 303 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 23. See, e.g., the 2004 decision
of the Constitutional Court of Spain in the case of Manuel Jiménez de Parga y Cabrera, upholding the position
that invasion of a home by external noise can constitute a violation of the privacy rights of the home. S.T.S.,
Feb. 23, 2004 (S.T.C. No. 16/2004) (Spain).

252

[9] KRAVCHENKO & BONINE.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

9/10/20123:00 PM

Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 25
violation of her rights because “no public official had entered her home or
39
attacked her physical integrity.” The Constitutional Court of Spain ruled that the
issue of respect for private life had not been raised in lower courts and that the
presence of fumes, smells, and noise did not amount to a breach of the right to
40
inviolability of the home.
After exhausting efforts in Spanish national courts, Mrs. López Ostra applied
to the European Commission on Human Rights for relief. The Commission found
a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, which protects “private and family
41
life.” The case then moved on to the ECHR. The brevity with which the Court
treated the question of whether pollution can be considered an infringement of
Article 8 is quite remarkable. On this key jurisprudential issue, it spent no
analytical energy, but simply said: “Naturally, severe environmental pollution
may affect individuals’ well-being and prevent them from enjoying their homes
42
in such a way as to affect their private and family life adversely. . . .”
The case also posed the question whether Spain could be held liable when the
most immediate cause of the pollution was a private company, not the State. The
Court had no problem with finding that it could. Although the Spanish and local
authorities were “theoretically not directly responsible” for the pollution, “the
town allowed the plant to be built on its land and the State subsidised the plant’s
43
construction.” After some, but not all, of the pollution emanating from the plant
was prevented, “the council’s members could not be unaware that the
44
environmental problems continued. . . .” With this remark, the Court appeared
to transition into finding that inaction by the State could be a ground for liability.
The Court also addressed “whether the national authorities took the measures
necessary for protecting the applicant’s right to respect for her home and for her
45
private and family life under Article 8.” It found that the municipality “failed to
take steps” to protect Mrs. López Ostra and also “resisted judicial decisions” that
46
would have helped her. In addition, it found that other State authorities

39. López Ostra, 303 Eur. Ct. H.R.at 45. The Spanish Supreme Court has subsequently reversed its
position on this. Moreno Gómez v. Spain, 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 327
40. López Ostra, 303 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 45-46. In a later case, the Spanish Constitutional Court accepted
that noise pollution could amount to such a violation. S.T.S., Feb. 23, 2004 (S.T.C. No. 16/2004) (Spain),
available at http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/jurisprudencia/Pages/Sentencia.aspx?cod=8215 (“una
exposición prolongada a unos determinados niveles de ruido, que puedan objetivamente calificarse como
evitables e insoportables, ha de merecer la protección dispensada al derecho fundamental a la intimidad
personal y familiar, en el ámbito domiciliario”). Id. The authors thank Abogado Eduardo Salazar of Murcia,
Spain for providing this and other Spanish cases.
41. López Ostra, 303 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 50.
42. Id. at 54.
43. Id. at 55.
44. Id. at 55.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 56.
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47

“contributed to prolonging the situation” through participation in litigation on
the side of the factory. The Court did not undertake a complete analysis of State
responsibility to protect citizens from pollution, however, leaving that for another
day.
Finding an intrusion by air pollution into Mrs. López Ostra’s private and
family life did not end the inquiry. In interpreting Article 8 of the Convention,
the Court stated that “regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck
between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a
48
whole.” In evaluating a situation involving State decision-making and liability
(and even more so in considering what is an appropriate remedy in such a
situation), the Court uses the “margin of appreciation” doctrine. Under this
doctrine, the Court allows the State a certain degree of discretion. Despite this
margin of appreciation, the Court ruled in Mrs. López Ostra’s case that the State
did not strike a “fair balance between the interest of the town’s economic wellbeing . . . and the applicant’s effective enjoyment of her right to respect for her
49
home and her private and family life.” Accordingly, it found that Article 8 had
50
been violated.
The Court ordered compensation even though a pecuniary value could not be
established for the loss suffered by the applicant. In addition to the nuisance
caused by the gas fumes, noise, and smells from the plant, the Court took into
consideration the distress and anxiety felt by the applicant as she saw the
situation persisting and her daughter’s health deteriorating. The Court awarded
51
Mrs. López Ostra 4,000,000 Spanish pesetas.
This was not the end of the dispute over pollution from the SACURSA
facility, however. In 1993 and 1994, the Mayor of Lorca granted a license that
allowed the facility to continue in operation after imposing some “corrective
52
measures” for treatment of wastewater and disposal of sludge. When two other
residents (D.ª Elisa y D.ª Silvia) filed a lawsuit complaining about continued
pollution, the case made its way again to the Supreme Court of Spain. That court
ruled that the 1994 López Ostra case of the ECHR was not controlling because of
the subsequent grant of a pollution license along with corrective measures. As the

47. Id.
48. Id. at 54-55.
49. Id. at 56. For some analysis of the “margin of appreciation” and “fair balance,” see Richard
Desgagné, Integrating Environmental Values into the European Convention on Human Rights, 89 AM. J. INT’L
L. 263, 276 (1995).
50. López Ostra, 303 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 56-58.
51. Id. at 58.
52. Tribunal Supremo, Sala Tercera, de lo Contencioso-administrativo, Sección 5ª, Sentencia de 4 Jul.
2002, rec. 4705/1997, Roj: STS 4967/2002, at “Primero,” available at http://www.poderjudicial.es (navigate to
Canal Judicial, then to Jurisprudencia under Tribunal Supremo, where you may conduct a search).
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plaintiffs did not discuss the corrective measures, their case could not establish a
53
violation of the right to privacy.
Nonetheless, López Ostra represented a significant turning point for
54
environmental claims under the Convention regime. It was the first case in
which the ECHR found a breach of the Convention as a consequence of
environmental harm. The Court’s decision left it somewhat unclear, however,
whether the outcome was based primarily on actions taken by various authorities
(for example, the state subsidy, local permission to build the plant, and
prolonging the situation by litigating on the factory’s side), on inaction by
authorities (inaction by the council’s members, national authorities’ failure to
take necessary measures, municipality’s failure to take steps), or on both—that is,
the question remains whether both a negative and a positive duty existed and was
breached. Those grounds for liability were addressed more clearly in a case
55
decided by the Court four years later, Guerra v. Italy.
b. Government Inaction and Positive Duty: Guerra v. Italy (1998)
A few years after the López Ostra case, the European Court took another step
in the direction of recognizing environmental rights and State responsibility
under Article 8. It held squarely that the right to respect for private and family
life could be considered violated by government inaction as well as by action.
Furthermore, it ruled that a government’s failure to provide information to
citizens on environmental risks constituted a violation of Article 8. The Court
also hinted that other Articles of the Convention might someday be put to use in
pollution cases. In fact, some judges would have gone even farther and
56
immediately applied Articles 2 and 10 to the case.
The case Guerra v. Italy arose as a result of pollution emitted from a factory
in Italy that produced fertilizers and other chemicals. The factory had been
classified as “high risk” according to criteria set out in a presidential decree that
was adopted to implement the “Seveso Directive” of the Council of the European
57
Communities. The factory emitted air pollution for several years, as a byproduct

53. Id. at “Cuarto.”
54. Various authors have made this point, including, most recently, Ole W. Pedersen, European
Environmental Human Rights and Environmental Rights: A Long Time Coming?, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L.
REV. 73, 86 (2008).
55. Guerra v. Italy, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 210; see infra notes 51-67 and accompanying text.
56. Guerra, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 232, 234-35, 236 (concurring opinions of Judge Walsh, Judge
Jambrek, and Judge Vilhjálmsson); see infra notes 52-57.
57. Guerra, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 216. The first “Seveso Directive” was issued by the European
Communities (later the European Union) in response to a chemical explosion at a factory in Seveso, Italy, in
1976, in which dioxin and other pollutants contaminated a wide area. Council Directive 82/501/EEC, 1982 25
O.J. (L 230) 1 [hereinafter Seveso I]. It was replaced December 9, 1996, by “Seveso II.” Council Directive
96/82/EC, art. 18, 1996 O.J. (L 10) 13 (EU) [hereinafter Seveso II]; see infra note 173 and text accompanying
note 174.
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from the manufacturing of both fertilizers and caprolactam, the latter a chemical
compound. In 1976, a serious accident occurred when the scrubbing tower for the
ammonia synthesis gases exploded, and several tons of potassium carbonate and
bicarbonate solution containing arsenic trioxide were emitted into the
atmosphere. As a result, 150 people were admitted to hospital with acute arsenic
58
poisoning. Due to pollution emissions that drifted into their town from the
factory, 420 residents of the town of Manfredonia filed legal actions in local
court in 1985 against directors of the company for various offenses. They
initiated a range of legal actions, including criminal proceedings for noncompliance with various environmental regulations. Nothing happened for
59
several years.
In 1988, Ms. Anna Maria Guerra and thirty-nine other women who lived in
the town of Manfredonia, all of whom lived within approximately one kilometer
of the factory, applied to the European Commission on Human Rights for relief.
The applicants complained that local authorities had not taken appropriate action
to reduce the pollution by the factory and prevent the risk of another accident.
They argued that this lack of action infringed their rights to life and physical
60
integrity under Article 2 of the European Convention. They also complained
that the State had failed to provide information about the risks from the pollution
and how to proceed in the event of an accident. This, they argued, was a breach
61
of their right to information under Article 10 of the Convention. In the
meantime, the factory had shifted to producing only fertilizers. It remained
categorized as high risk, but no plan was devised for notifying the public in the
case of a future disaster. Another seven years elapsed before the then-existing
European Commission on Human Rights finally forwarded the case on to the
62
ECHR in 1995.
In the meantime, the plant ceased production of fertilizers in 1994, although
a plant for the treatment of feed and wastewater continued, along with a
thermoelectric power station, and it remained possible for caprolactam
63
production to resume at any time. When the case moved on to the ECHR, Ms.
Guerra and her co-complainants asserted that their right to respect for family life
under Article 8 of the Convention had been infringed, in part as a result of the
64
authorities’ failure to provide them with relevant information.

58. Guerra, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 216.
59. Judgment was finally given in 1991. See id. at 217. Two directors were sentenced to prison for short
terms and others escaped prison sentences because of a statute of limitations and amnesties. The two prison
terms were overturned in 1992 by an appellate court. Id.
60. Id. at 214-17, 222.
61. Id. at 221.
62. Id. at 216, 222.
63. Id. at 216.
64. Id. at 221.
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Three years later the Court, sitting as a Grand Chamber with twenty justices
participating, ruled unanimously that Italy “did not fulfill its obligation to secure
the applicants’ right to respect for their private and family life,” in violation of
65
Article 8 of the Convention. In doing so, it relied on its earlier ruling in López
Ostra. “The Court reiterates that severe environmental pollution may affect
individuals’ well-being and prevent them from enjoying their homes in such a
way as to affect their private and family life adversely (see, mutatis mutandis, the
66
L pez Ostra judgment . . .).” In reaching that conclusion, however, the facts
arguably forced the Court to go beyond the issues posed by López Ostra,
compelling it to decide that Article 8 not only forbids action by the State but also
provides a remedy for inaction by the State. That is, the Article 8 right imposes a
67
duty on the State to take positive, protective action in the environmental field.
The Court started cautiously, pronouncing that “there may be positive obligations
68
inherent in effective respect for private or family life . . . .” That is, simply not
interfering with private or family life is not enough. To be “effective,” the
requirement of section 1 of Article 8 that the State “respect” private or family life
69
may imply “positive obligations,” the Court said. The Court then became more
definite: it found it necessary to determine “whether the national authorities took
70
the necessary steps to ensure effective protection of the applicants’ right.”
65. Id. at 228. Because it found a violation under Article 8, the Court ruled that there was no need to
consider an additional claim under Article 2, the right to life, which we will address in part II-C of this article.
Id. at 228-29.The Court made a similar decision in Öçkan v. Turquie [Öçkan v. Turkey], no. 46771/99, paras.
50, 57 Eur. Ct. H.R. (28 Mar. 2006), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en
(search Öçkan v. Turquie under Case Title), in which it found it unnecessary to examine claims of a violation
of Article 2’s protection for the right to life because it found a violation of the right of private and family life.
The case involved threats to an underground aquifer and the corresponding ecosystem from cyanide leach gold
mining. Id. at paras. 6, 7, 10.
66. Guerra, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 228.
67. This duty of positive, protective action to safeguard private interference with human rights was first
discussed extensively in two ECHR decisions in 1979. Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979), and
Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979). In the latter case, a woman was unable to afford the cost of a
lawyer to help her process a judicial separation from her husband. Id. at 6. The court said:
The Court does not consider that Ireland can be said to have “interfered” with Mrs. Airey’s private
or family life: the substance of her complaint is not that the State has acted but that it has failed to
act. However, although the object of Article 8 (art. 8) is essentially that of protecting the individual
against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain
from such interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive
obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or family life . . . .
Id. at 17. This position was reiterated in X and Y v. Netherlands, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), (1985), which
involved the government’s failure to protect a mentally retarded young woman from being raped in an
institution. Id. at 8. For a discussion of the duty of the state to take positive, protective action in human rights
courts and institutions in other regions as well, see Aoife Nolan, Addressing Economic and Social Rights
Violations by Non-State Actors Through the Role of the State: A Comparison of Regional Approaches to the
‘Obligation to Protect,’ 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 225 (2009).
68. Guerra, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 227 (emphasis added) (quoting Airey, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
67).
69. Id.
70. Id.
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The Court determined that the inaction through which the State failed to
protect the Article 8 right was its failure to provide information to Guerra and
others “that would have enabled them to assess the risks they and their families
might run if they continued to live at Manfredonia, a town particularly exposed to
71
danger in the event of an accident at the factory.” This “information right,” an
element of Article 8’s right to “respect,” will be discussed in more detail in part
II-B of this article.
The Court awarded some monetary compensation for violation of the rights
72
of Ms. Guerra and others. It did not, however, order cleanup of the industrial
estate where the explosion had occurred:
The Court notes that the Convention does not empower it to accede to
such a request. It reiterates that it is for the State to choose the means to
be used in its domestic legal system in order to comply with the
provisions of the Convention or to redress the situation that has given
73
rise to the violation of the Convention . . . .
This reluctance to mandate a broad-based solution to the environmental
problem identified in the case is understandable for a court that has little means
of enforcing the decisions that it makes and that, perhaps, is concerned with
staying out of the business of telling governments to take specific actions. But
shying away from ordering anything but compensation may dramatically
decrease the respect paid to decisions of the ECHR. The limited amount of
compensation would be unlikely, by itself, to impact significantly the behavior of
governments or corporations causing pollution.
c. Balancing Away Environmental Impacts: Hatton v. United Kingdom
(2003)
If the Court appeared to some people, on the basis of the López Ostra and
Guerra decisions, to be on a mission of broad-ranging environmental reform
through the use of Article 8’s right to private and family life, such a view surely
became less tenable as a result of the ECHR decision in Hatton v. United
74
Kingdom in 2003.
Eight persons who were members of a citizens group filed an application to
the European Commission on Human Rights, which in turn was transmitted to
the Court. Their assertion was that excessive noise from takeoffs and landings at

71. Id. at 228.
72. Id. at 229.
73. Id. at 230 (citing several previous ECHR cases).
74. Hatton v. United Kingdom, 2003-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 189. The Hatton decision was vigorously
criticized in David Hart & Marina Wheeler, Night Flights and Strasbourg’s Retreat from Environmental Human
Rights, 16 J. ENVTL. L. 100, 132-39 (2004).
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Heathrow Airport, near London, interfered with their sleep. In 2001 a seven75
judge Chamber ruled by a vote of 5-2 that Article 8 had been violated. The
matter was referred, however, to a Grand Chamber—a panel of seventeen judges.
In its 2003 judgment, the Grand Chamber noted that in a previous case, Powell
76
and Rayner v. United Kingdom, which also involved applicants complaining
about aircraft noise, “the Court held that Article 8 was relevant, since ‘the quality
of [each] applicant’s private life and the scope for enjoying the amenities of his
home [had] been adversely affected by the noise generated by aircraft using
77
Heathrow Airport.’” The Court also quoted López Ostra and Guerra regarding
78
how pollution can violate Article 8. But then the Court reiterated “the
fundamentally subsidiary role of the Convention” in societies subject to it. The
Court considered that “national authorities,” with “direct democratic
legitimation,” were “in principle better placed than an international court to
79
evaluate local needs and conditions.” Therefore, “the role of the domestic
policy-maker should be given special weight” and the Court must give a “wide”
80
“margin of appreciation” (range of deference) to national legislative decisions.
The Court went on to remark on the “the fair balance that has to be struck
between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a
81
whole.” All this led to the Court’s finding that there was no violation of Article
82
8.
The Court lauded the fact that restrictions on flight patterns and engine noise
enacted in 1993 were the “latest in the series of restrictions on night flights which
83
began at Heathrow in 1962 . . . .” It said that the government’s undertaking
“‘not to allow a worsening of noise at night, and ideally to improve it’ was
maintained” and “the authorities continu[ed] to monitor the situation with a view
84
to possible improvements.” Although the Court had “no doubt that the
implementation of the 1993 Scheme was susceptible of adversely affecting the
quality of the applicants’ private life and the scope for their enjoying the
amenities of their respective homes, and thus their rights protected by Article 8 of
85
the Convention,” that was not enough to find liability. Despite the
acknowledgments regarding loss of enjoyment suffered by the applicants, the
Court must consider whether, in the implementation of the 1993 Scheme, “a fair

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Hatton, 2003-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 195-97.
Powell & Rayner v. United Kingdom, 172 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990).
Hatton, 2003-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 216 (quoting Powell & Rayner, 172 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 223.
Id.
Id.
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balance was struck between the competing interests of the individuals affected by
86
the night noise and the community as a whole.” (This was unlike the situation in
López Ostra and Guerra, where authorities were failing to comply with domestic
laws. The applicants in the Heathrow Airport case did not suggest that the
87
Heathrow policy “was in any way unlawful at a domestic level.”) As for the
policy itself, the Court observed that section 2 of Article 8 provides for a
88
balancing test: In considering whether the State had “struck a fair balance”
between economic interests and the persons adversely affected by noise
disturbances, the Court went out of its way to reduce environmental
considerations to just one factor among many—by no means the most important
one nor one deserving any special status:
Environmental protection should be taken into consideration by States in
acting within their margin of appreciation and by the Court in its review
of that margin, but it would not be appropriate for the Court to adopt a
special approach in this respect by reference to a special status of
89
environmental human rights.
In addition to noting the benefits to economic competitiveness of the United
Kingdom, in allowing the arrival of late-night flights from distant countries, the
Court said that the government could validly “take into account the individuals’
90
ability to leave the area.” The Court said that the authorities had not overstepped
their allowable margin of appreciation, nor had there been “fundamental
91
procedural flaws in the preparation of the 1993 regulations” on airport noise.
d. Limiting the Consideration of Environmental Impacts: Kyrtatos v.
Greece (2003)
In another case, decided the same year as Hatton, the Court decided that
although some impacts on the environment might adversely affect a person’s
“well-being,” others would not—at least if all they involved was a “swamp.” In
92
Kyrtatos v. Greece, a woman and her son, living in Germany, owned a house in
Greece near a protected wetland bird habitat; they vacationed there from time to
time. Local authorities had redrawn the urban growth boundary to allow
development construction in the wetland. Mr. Nikos Kyrtatos and his mother,
Mrs. Sofia Kyrtatou, challenged the development in national court in Greece, as

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
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did the Greek Society for the Protection of the Environment and Cultural
93
Heritage. The Supreme Administrative Court of Greece ruled that the rezoning
and development activities violated the environmental protection provisions of
the Greek Constitution. When the local authorities failed to respect the national
court decision and take action to restore the damaged wetland by removing
94
buildings, the applicants filed their case in the ECHR.
With regard to the challenge the applicants made based on Article 8, they
95
were unsuccessful. The Court agreed that under López Ostra harm to an
individual’s well-being could amount to a violation of Article 8 without a
requirement that the activity at issue seriously endanger health. However, the
Court could not conceive of how harm to species living in a wetland (which the
Court studiously referred to as a “swamp”) could affect a neighbor’s well-being.
The Court said it might have ruled differently if the harm had been to a forest:
[T]he applicants have not brought forward any convincing arguments
showing that the alleged damage to the birds and other protected species
living in the swamp was of such a nature as to directly affect their own
rights under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. It might have been
otherwise if, for instance, the environmental deterioration complained of
had consisted in the destruction of a forest area in the vicinity of the
applicants’ house, a situation which could have affected more directly
96
the applicants’ own well-being.
This remarkable splitting of ecological (and psychological) hairs—or
imposition of the Court’s own aesthetic standards—drew a strong dissent from
Judge Zagrebelsky, who wrote that “it could hardly be said that the deterioration
of the environment did not lead to a corresponding deterioration in the quality of
97
the applicants’ life . . . .” The dissenting judge was particularly critical of the
swamp/forest distinction, writing, “I see no major difference between the
destruction of a forest and the destruction of the extraordinary swampy
98
environment the applicants were able to enjoy near their house.”
One will not know whether visual intrusion and harm to aesthetic
sensibilities are completely outside the ambit of Article 8 until a future forestdestruction case is brought to the Court. It seems likely, however, that litigants
have a better chance of success if the environmental harm that they bring to the
Court involves pollution.

93. Id. at 262-63.
94. Id. at 263.
95. Id. They did, however, obtain a ruling that the right to fair trial had been violated under Article 6 of
the Convention. Id. at 270.
96. Id. at 268-69.
97. Id. at 272 (Zagrebelsky, J., dissenting).
98. Id.
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e. The Court as Enforcer of National Laws: Fadeyeva v. Russia (2005)
and Ledyayeva v. Russia (2006)
While Hatton and Kyrtatos signified clear limits on the Court’s willingness
to put Article 8 into service of protected environments, cases decided shortly
thereafter showed that Article 8 is far from dead. A number of cases have
continued to arise in which a government has promised, but failed, to curb
pollution or to move people away from it. The Court has found it relatively easy
to find violations in such situations.
Countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union or within its orbit of
influence inherited a concept of “sanitary protection zones” (also called “sanitary
security zones,” “sanitary exclusion zones,” or, in the West, simply “buffer
zones”) from the past. The idea behind such zones is to create an area or buffer
zone in which people are not allowed to live because it is too close to pollution
99
sources. If the concentration of a pollutant from a factory in the ambient air
100
outside the factory exceeds the “maximum permissible limit” (“MPL”)
established for a pollutant, the factory must establish a sanitary protection zone
101
covering the area in which the MPL is exceeded. Outside the boundary of the
zone, MPLs must be met. Inside, they need not be, but housing, schools, and
102
hospitals are prohibited within the zone. By comparison, in the United States
national ambient air quality standards for air pollutants must be met everywhere
103
beyond the “fence-line” of an industrial establishment.
In countries that use the sanitary protection zone concept, people who are
living within a sanitary zone must be resettled outside of it. In theory, ordinary
citizens would therefore not be exposed to pollutant concentrations above the
104
MPLs. The reality is different because of the ineffectiveness of resettlement
policies. In 2004, Russia had 72,786 enterprises with sanitary protection zones

99. A simple explanation of the concept can be found in Victor Davydov, Russia: Sanitary Protection
Zone Requirements, EHS J. (Nov. 24, 2010), http://ehsjournal.org/http:/ehsjournal.org/victor-davydov/russiasanitary-protection-zone-spz-requirements-overview/2010/.
100. MPLs (termed PDKs in Russian) are the allowable levels of various polluting substances, as
established by Russian legislation. See Dep’t for the Execution of Judgments of the Eur. Court of Human
Rights, Industrial Pollution in Breach of the European Convention: Measures Required by a European Court
Judgment, COUNCIL EUR. paras. 6-8 (2007), https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1094807&Site=DC
[hereinafter DEP’T EXECUTION JUDGMENTS] (describing Russian law and policy in this regard).
101. Id.
102. See id. at para. 8.
103. The air quality standards in the United States apply to “ambient air,” and that is defined thus:
“Ambient air means that portion of the atmosphere, external to buildings, to which the general public has
access.” 40 C.F.R. § 50.1(e) (2011). The U.S. Environmental Protection even has a “Fence-Line Monitoring
Program” for enforcement. See Clean Air Act National Enforcement Initiatives, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/civil/caa/caaenfpriority.html#Fence.compliance/civil/caa/caaenfpriority.html (last
updated May 18, 2010).
104. See Davydov, supra note 99.
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105

but only 144,524 persons had been resettled outside of the zones. This
amounted to an average of fewer than two persons per zone. In other words, on
average, less than one family from every zone had been resettled. When the
problem of resettlement arises, a typical reaction is to reduce the size of the
106
protection zone so as to exclude people from any resettlement duty. These
reductions may well occur without any air quality monitoring that justifies the
107
reduction.
Ms. Nadezhda Mikhaylovna Fadeyeva lived in the town of Cherepovets in
Russia, where an important steel-producing cement plant, “Severstal,” is located.
In 1982, her family moved to a flat situated about 450 meters from the boundary
of the plant. The plant is the largest iron smelter in Russia and “the largest
108
contributor to air pollution of all metallurgical plants in Russia.” The “sanitary
109
protection zone” around the plant covered a 5,000 meter-wide area. Although
this zone was supposed to separate the plant from the town’s residential areas,
110
thousands of people, including the applicant’s family, lived there. A Decree of
the Council of Ministers of the Russian Soviet Republic, dated September 10,
1974, obliged the Ministry of Black Metallurgy “to resettle the inhabitants of the
111
sanitary security zone who lived in districts nos. 213 and 214 by 1977.”
112
However, this had not been done.
In 1990, the Government of the Russian Soviet Republic adopted a program
that stated:
“the concentration of toxic substances in the town’s air exceed[s] the
acceptable norms many times” and that the morbidity rate of
Cherepovets residents was higher than average . . . [T]he steel plant was
required to reduce its toxic emissions to safe levels by 1998 . . . The steel
plant was also ordered to finance the construction of 20,000 square
metres of residential property every year for the resettlement of people
113
[who were] living within its sanitary security zone.

105. DEP’T EXECUTION JUDGMENTS, supra note 100, at para. 9.
106. See, e.g., Lukpan Akhmediarov, Karachaganak’s Sanitary Protection Zone Must Be Expanded,
URALSK WKLY. (Apr. 6, 2006), http://www.crudeaccountability.org/en/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,
print,0&cntnt01articleid=12&cntnt01showtemplate=false&cntnt01returnid=69 (noting the Prosecutor of the
Western Kazakhstan Oblast challenged the reduction in the radius of the sanitary zone, excluding the village of
Berezovka and therefore any need to provide resettlement).
107. Id.
108. Fadeyeva v. Russia, 2005-IV Eur. T. H.R. 257, at 262-65.
109. Id. at 262-63.
110. Id. at 263.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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Two years later, in 1992, the local authorities reduced the size of the zone to
1,000 meters, which of course had the effect of reducing the number of families
114
that would have to be resettled. In 1996, the Government of the Russian
Federation adopted a program to reduce emissions and to resettle people. The
second paragraph of the program’s directive stated:
“The concentration of certain polluting substances in the town’s
residential areas is twenty to fifty times higher than the maximum
permissible limits (MPLs). . . . The biggest ‘contributor’ to atmospheric
pollution is Severstal PLC, which is responsible for 96% of all
emissions. The highest level of air pollution is registered in the
residential districts immediately adjacent to Severstal’s industrial
site. . . . The situation is aggravated by an almost complete overlap of
industrial and residential areas of the city, in the absence of their
115
separation by sanitary security zones.
“The [D]ecree further stated that ‘the environmental situation in the city
116
ha[s] resulted in a continuing deterioration in public health.’”
The applicant, Mrs. Fadeyeva, made various attempts to be resettled outside
the sanitary zone. In 1995, she brought a lawsuit in the town court seeking
resettlement. She alleged that the environmental situation in the zone was
dangerous for health and life. In April 1996, the court examined the situation and
did not make an order to resettle the applicant, but it stated that the local
117
authorities must place her on a “priority waiting list” to obtain new housing.
Despite a favorable appeals court ruling, nothing was done. In February 1997,
“the bailiff discontinued the enforcement proceedings on the ground that there
was no ‘priority waiting list’ for new housing for residents of the sanitary
118
security zone.”
In 1999, the applicant brought a new lawsuit in the town court against the
municipality seeking execution of the judgment of April 1996 and asking to be
provided with a flat or the funds to buy one. “The applicant claimed . . . that
systematic toxic emissions and noise from Severstal PLC’s facilities violated her
basic right to respect for her private life and home, [which was] guaranteed by
119
the Russian Constitution and the European Convention.” The town court

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
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dismissed this action on the basis that no “priority waiting list” and no alternative
120
housing existed. This was upheld later by the regional court.
Finally, Ms. Fadeyeva filed an application to the ECHR in 1999. After the
Court transmitted a copy of the application to the Russian government, the
municipality went to court locally in 2002 and argued that it lacked the authority
121
to establish a zone in the first place. The local court agreed, canceling the
122
1,000-meter zone. Therefore, by the time the case reached the ECHR for
decision, there was no longer any defined zone at all. The government argued
that this meant the applicants no longer had any legal case. The Court ignored
this maneuver, pointing out that the zone still existed at the relevant times giving
123
rise to the original application.
124
The Court found that the State was in violation of Article 8. To get to that
conclusion, it first said that not all adverse effects on the environment nor all
adverse effects a person may suffer will necessarily serve to bring a case within
the ambit of Article 8. Rather, the adverse effects of environmental pollution
“must attain a certain minimum level if they are to fall within the scope of Article
125
8.” Furthermore, the adverse effects must be more than the “environmental
126
hazards inherent to life in every modern city.” Some “level of severity” must be
127
attained. Ms. Fadeyeva was unable to provide any proof that her illness was
128
caused by pollution from the steel plant. Nonetheless, the Court received
129
evidence that the ambient levels of several pollutants exceeded the MPLs, and
that an expert had concluded that levels of formaldehyde and carbon disulphide
would lead to excess amounts of cancer and other ill effects in residents of the
130
area, as compared to areas without such elevated pollution levels. The Court
said that it was “conceivable” that the applicant did not suffer any special and
131
extraordinary damage, but the “very strong combination of indirect evidence
and presumptions makes it possible to conclude that the applicant’s health
deteriorated as a result of her prolonged exposure to the industrial emissions
132
. . .” Even if this were not true, “there can be no doubt that [the pollution]

120. Id. at 266-67.
121. Id. at 261, 264, 288-89.
122. Id. at 264.
123. Id. at 288-89.
124 Id. at 293.
125. Id. at 277 (citing López Ostra and Hatton).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 279.
129. Id. at 280-81.
130. Id. at 280-81. The expert, Dr. Mark Chernaik, happens to be a former student of one of the authors
of this article.
131. Id. at 281.
132. Id.
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133

adversely affected her quality of life at home.” Consequently, the Court
accepted “that the actual detriment to the applicant’s health and well-being
reached a level sufficient to bring it within the scope of Article 8 of the
134
Convention.”
Significantly, the Court reiterated the positive-duty doctrine of Guerra. It
pointed out that the steel plant “was not owned, controlled, or operated by the
135
State,” as had been the case in Guerra.
At the same time, the Court points out that the State’s responsibility in
environmental cases may arise from a failure to regulate private industry
(see Hatton and Others . . .). Accordingly, the applicant’s complaints fall
to be analysed in terms of a positive duty on the State to take reasonable
and appropriate measures to secure the applicant’s rights under Article 8
§ 1 of the Convention (see Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom . . .
and Guerra and Others v. Italy . . .). In these circumstances, the Court’s
first task is to assess whether the State could reasonably be expected to
act so as to prevent or put an end to the alleged infringement of the
136
applicant’s rights.
Since the problems were “long-standing and well known” and “the municipal
137
authorities were aware of the continuing environmental problems,” the
authorities were “in a position to evaluate the pollution hazards and to take
138
adequate measures to prevent or reduce them.” That was sufficient to “raise an
139
issue of the State’s positive obligation under Article 8 of the Convention.”
Finally, the Court concluded that, despite any margin of appreciation that must be
140
allowed to a State, here there had not been offered any “effective solution.”
Therefore, the State “has failed to strike a fair balance between the interests of
the community and the applicant’s effective enjoyment of her right to respect for
her home and her private life. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8
141
. . . .”
Ms. Fadeyeva asked the Court to order the Russian government to offer her
new housing or, in the alternative, 30,000 Euros to enable her to purchase
142
housing outside the sanitary protection zone. A concurring opinion would have

133.
134.
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136.
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pushed for a broader solution, expressing concern about the whole sanitary
protection zone concept as well as the concept of resettlement:
In the present case . . . the resettlement of those living near the plant may
be regarded as only one of many possible solutions, and, in my view, not
the best one: had the authorities been stricter and more consistent in
applying domestic environmental regulations, the problem would have
been resolved without any need to resettle the population and with a
143
positive impact on the environmental situation in general.
However, the Court chose not to dictate what measures the government
should take in response to the judgment. It said merely that “the Court has
established the Government’s obligation to take appropriate measures to remedy
144
the applicant’s individual situation.” The Court did award 6,000 Euros in nonpecuniary damage for “much inconvenience, mental distress and even a degree of
145
physical suffering.” It also awarded 10,308 Euros in payments for the time that
146
Ms. Fadeyeva’s Russian and British lawyers spent on the case.
A year after the Fadeyeva case, the Court considered similar claims from
several applicants living in the same apartment complex area and within the same
“sanitary security zone” near the Severstal plant in cases collected under the
147
name Ledyayeva v. Russia. The lawyers who filed the Fadeyeva case had filed
these other cases at the same time. After examining the evidence and arguments
of both parties, the Court said:
[T]he Court does not see any reason to depart from its findings in the
Fadeyeva judgment. . . . [T]he Court concludes that the actual detriment
to the applicants’ health and well-being reached a level sufficient to
148
bring it within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention.
After finding a violation of Article 8, the Court turned to the issue of whether
the authorities had “struck a fair balance between the interests of the applicants
149
and those of the community as a whole.” The Court recalled its reaction in the
earlier Fadeyeva case:

143. Id. at 298-99 (Kovler, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 294 (Kovler, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 293.
146. See id. at 296.
147. Ledyayeva v. Russia, App. Nos. 53157/99, 53247/99, 53695/00, 56850/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Oct. 26, 2006),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search Ledyayeva v. Russia under Case Title).
148. Id. at para. 100. In Ledyayeva, the applicants did not present evidence of actual health damage as a
result of the factory’s pollution and the Court did not require any. Id. at paras. 37, 100.
149. Id. at para. 101.
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[In Fadeyeva,] [t]he Court accepted that, given the complexity and the
scale of the environmental problem around the Severstal steel-plant, this
problem could not be resolved in a short period of time. However, it did
150
not mean that the authorities might remain passive.
The Court concludes that, despite the wide margin of appreciation left to
the respondent State, the authorities failed to take appropriate measures
in order to protect the applicants’ right to respect for their homes and
private lives against serious environmental nuisances. In particular, the
authorities have neither resettled the applicants outside the dangerous
zone, nor have they provided for a compensation for those seeking the
resettlement. Furthermore, it appears that the authorities failed to develop
and implement an efficient public policy which would induce the steelplant to reduce its emissions to the safe levels within a reasonable time.
151
There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
The decisions in Fadeyeva and Ledyayeva were based in large part on proof
that maximum air contaminant levels were exceeded. But the Court buttressed its
rulings finding Article 8 violations by citing various facts and testimony
indicating that excessive levels of the pollutants in question would likely cause
152
harm to humans.
Turning to the question of justification under Section 2 of Article 8 (“fair
balance”), one scholar has argued that Fadeyeva demonstrates that breach of
domestic law is, in itself, sufficient to deprive the State of any fair balance
153
arguments. Indeed, the court in Fadeyeva said, “[d]irect interference by the
State with the exercise of Article 8 rights will not be compatible with paragraph 2
unless it is ‘in accordance with the law’. The breach of domestic law in these
154
cases would necessarily lead to a finding of a violation of the Convention.” It is
doubtless too soon, however, to determine whether mere breach of domestic law
along with some harm will be enough on which to ground a complaint under the
Convention.

150. Id. at para. 104.
151. Id. at para. 110.
152. See, e.g., Fadeyeva v. Russia, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 at 280-81 (“very strong combination of
indirect evidence and presumptions”; levels 10 times the MCLs; affidavit by Dr. Mark Chernaik; findings of
local courts that resettlement was necessary).
153. “States cannot expect to persuade the European Court that the needs of the community can best be
met in such cases by not enforcing the law.” Alan Boyle, Human Rights or Environmental Rights? A
Reassessment, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL L. REV. 471, 489 (2007).
154. Fadeyeva, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 283.
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f.

Is Anyone Paying Attention? Dubetska v. Ukraine (2011)

In a 2011 case, Dubetska v. Ukraine, the problem of industrial pollution near
people’s houses arose again, this time in the context of breaches of domestic law
155
by a government and additional evidence showing a serious problem as a result.
The applicants were Mrs. Ganna Pavlivna Dubetska and ten others, together
making up two families. Their two houses were located in Vilshyna hamlet, Lviv
156
Region, Ukraine, in the Chervonograd coal-mining basin. In 1960, the State
had put the Velykomostivska coal mine No. 8 into operation. A spoil heap of the
mine was placed 100 meters from the applicants’ family homes. In 1979, the
State had also opened the Chervonogradska coal processing factory in the
vicinity of the hamlet. During its operation, the factory piled up a new sixtymeter spoil heap located 430 meters from the Dubetska-Nayda family house and
157
420 meters from the Gavrylyuk-Vakiv family house.
As explained by the Court:
According to a number of studies by governmental and nongovernmental entities, the operation of the factory and the mine has had
adverse environmental effects. . . . [T]he mine’s and the factory’s spoil
heaps caused continuous infiltration of ground water, resulting in
flooding . . . According to an assessment commissioned by the State
Committee for Geology and Mineral Resource Utilization, . . . the
factory was a major contributor to pollution of the ground water . . . The
authors of the assessment contended, in particular, that:
Rocks from the spoil heaps contain a variety of toxic heavy metals
...
[C]oal-mining . . . in the region for over forty years has been
negatively affecting the environment . . . The general area of soil
subsidence is about 70 square kilometres. . . .
Extremely high pollution levels …. were found in the hamlet of
Vilshyna, not far from the coal-processing factory and mine no. 8
spoil heaps, in the wells of Mr T. and Mr Dubetskyy. We can testify
that even the appearance of this water does not give grounds to

155. Dubetska v. Ukraine, App. No. 30499/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 10, 2011), available at http://cmiskp.
echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search Dubetska v. Ukraine under Case Title).
156. Id. at paras. 1, 6-9. The interests of applicants were represented for several years in national courts
by Yaryna Ostapyk, a lawyer of the public interest environmental law firm Environment-People-Law.
157. Id. at paras. 10, 12.

269

[9] KRAVCHENKO & BONINE.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

9/10/20123:00 PM

2012 / Interpretation of Human Rights for the Protection of the Environment
consider it fit for any use. People from this community should be
158
supplied with drinking-quality water or resettled ….
The applicants alleged that their houses were damaged “as a result of soil
subsidence caused by mining activities and presented an acknowledgement of
159
this signed by the mine’s director” in January 1999. “[T]he mine promised to
160
pay for the repair of their houses but never did so.” The applicants also alleged
161
that they were “continuing to suffer from a lack of drinkable water.” They
contended that the hamlet had no access to a drinking water supply line until
2009. “Using the local well and stream water for washing and cooking purposes
162
caused itching and intestinal infections.”
Some of the applicants made allegations that they developed chronic diseases
163
“associated with the factory operation, especially with air pollution.” “They
presented medical certificates which stated that [they] were suffering from
164
chronic bronchitis and emphysema,” or had been diagnosed with carcinoma.
They also alleged that environmental factors created by mining affected
communication between family members, spouses, and children and thus
165
affected family life in violation of Article 8. “The applicants complained that
the State authorities had failed to protect their home, private, and family life from
166
excessive pollution generated by two State-owned industrial facilities.” They
further alleged a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on the ground that the
mine and factory are State-owned, and the State had failed to fulfill “its positive
167
obligation to regulate hazardous industrial activity.”
Considering a wide variety of evidence, including photographic evidence, the
168
Court held that there had been a breach of Article 8 of the Convention. The
State’s argument that it had engaged in a fair balance was rejected. The Court
said that “the Government’s approach to tackling pollution in the present case has
169
. . . been marked by numerous delays and inconsistent enforcement.” The Court
awarded compensation of non-pecuniary damages in full. The Dubetska-Nayda
family claimed 32,000 Euros and the Gavrylyuk-Vakiv family claimed 33,000
Euros as compensation for both the applicants’ physical suffering that resulted
from living in an unsafe environment as well as their psychological distress that
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
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resulted from complications in familial, interpersonal communication, and
“frustration with making prolonged unsuccessful efforts to obtain redress from
170
the public authorities.”
As to pecuniary damage, applicants claimed 28,000 Euros total—constituting
the market value of two comparable houses (one for each of the two applicant’s
families) in the neighboring area that was not affected by pollution. They argued
171
that “their houses had lost market value and could not be sold.”
The Court declined to award the applicants any pecuniary damages; it held
that the allegation that “their houses have lost market value” should have been
made and examined not under Article 8 of the Convention but under Article 1 of
Protocol no. 1, which protects property rights. There was therefore no causal link
172
between the violation found (Article 8) and the alleged loss of market value.
2. Procedural Rights in Article 8
One of the most interesting developments in recent years has been the
Court’s importing of procedural principles into its Article 8 jurisprudence. The
1998 case of Guerra v. Italy introduced the concept that failure to carry out the
State’s positive duty with regard to providing information that the public needs
could constitute a violation of Article 8. That concept of procedural duties
inherent in Article 8 has since been developed in several cases, starting with a
right to information and later expanding to include rights to public participation
and access to justice. The right to information has been developed largely in the
context of disasters, but has expanded beyond.
a. Duty to Provide Information: Guerra v. Italy (1998)
In 1976, a dense vapor cloud containing tetra-chloro-dibenzo-para-dioxin
(TCDD, commonly referred to simply as “dioxin”) was released from a reactor at
a chemical plant in Seveso, Italy. The dioxin contaminated a wide area; 600
people were evacuated from their homes, and more than “2,000 were treated for
173
dioxin poisoning.” In 1982, the European Council issued the so-called “Seveso
Directive,” requiring member States of the European Union to adopt laws and
policies to protect citizens against such events and provide some level of
174
information to them. Although the purpose of the Directive was to obtain
170. Id. at para. 163.
171. Id. at para. 158.
172. Id. at paras. 160-61.
173. Chemical Accidents (Seveso II) - Prevention, Preparedness and Response, EUR. COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/index.htm (last updated Mar. 6, 2012).
174. Seveso I, supra note 57. After further disasters, such as the disastrous 1984 leak of methyl
isocyanate at a chemical plant in Bhopal, India, which caused more than 2,500 deaths, and a spill contaminating
the Rhine River in 1986, the Seveso directive was amended twice—in 1987 and 1988. Chemical Accidents
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information and to mandate that local authorities develop plans to inform and
protect the public, the actual information collected by authorities from industrial
175
establishments was to be kept secret from the public.
Against this background, a governmental cover-up of information of even
greater magnitude occurred in connection with the 1986 nuclear disaster at the
Chernobyl nuclear plant in Ukraine. The government of the Soviet Union, despite
knowing that an explosion had occurred at Chernobyl on April 26, 1986, and that
radioactive particles were being released into the atmosphere at a significant rate,
withheld this information from the public for several days. It encouraged a
scheduled May Day parade to go forward five days later in Kyiv, the capital city,
176
despite the elevated levels of radiation being hidden from Ukraine’s citizens.
Adults and children (including family members of the authors) were showered
with radioactive particles, but still they did not know. When Ukrainian citizens
learned what had happened, they were outraged. The event was responsible for
creating an environmental movement that played a role in the collapse of the
177
Soviet Union. It led to an adoption of a provision in the Ukrainian Constitution
that makes information a fundamental right and makes withholding of
178
information a crime. On the Tenth Anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, April
26, 1996, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted
Resolution 1087, which not only referred to the risks associated with the
production and use of nuclear energy in the civil sector but asserted that “public
access to clear and full information . . . must be viewed as a basic human
179
right.” It can be said that the concept that the right to private and family life in
Article 8 of the European Convention includes a right to environmental
information may be traced to these events. In fact, in Guerra v. Italy the ECHR
made a special point of quoting from Resolution 1087 and terming the resolution
180
as “[o]f particular relevance . . . in the present case.”

(Seveso II) - Prevention, Preparedness and Response, supra note 173.
175. Seveso I, supra note 57, at art. 13.
176. See Will Englund, Chernobyl a Milestone on the Road to Ukrainian Independence, WASH. POST
(Apr. 24, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chernobyl-a-milestone-on-the-road-to-ukrainianindependence/2011/04/22/AFRghNdE_story.html. The niece of one of the authors participated in that parade as
a child. See Maggie Keenan, Reflections on Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, http://www.elaw.org/book/
export/html/5704 (last visited Jan. 28, 2012).
177. See Englund, supra note 176.
178. Конституція України [Constitution] Dec. 1, 1991, art. 50 (Ukr.), available at http://www.
president.gov.ua/en/content/constitution.html; see Svitlana Kravchenko, Is Access to Environmental
Information a Fundamental Human Right?, 11 OR. R. INT’L L. 227, 239-40 (2009).
179. Eur. Parl. Ass., On the Consequences of the Chernobyl Disaster, 16th Sess. Doc. No. 7538 (1996),
available at http://assembly.coe.int//main.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc96/
EDOC7538.htm. Later, in Öneryildiz v. Turkey, the Grand Chamber went further, noting that such a human
right to information had previously been found by the Court to be part of the right of private and family life
under Article 8 of the European Convention, citing the decision in Guerra. Öneryildiz v. Turkey, 2004-XII Eur.
Ct. H.R. 79.
180. Guerra v. Italy, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 210, 221.
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One might have expected the most relevant part of the Convention to be
Article 10, section 1, which talks of the “freedom . . . to receive and impart
181
information and ideas without interference by public authority.” But that
freedom, the Court said in Guerra, “cannot be construed as imposing on a State,
in circumstances such as those of the present case, positive obligations to collect
182
and disseminate information of its own motion.” That was not the end of the
matter, however. The Court went on to hold that failure to provide to the citizens
of the area “essential information that would have enabled them to assess the
risks they and their families might run if they continued to live at Manfredonia”
resulted in the State not meeting its obligation to secure the “right to respect for
183
their private and family life.”
The Court’s holding that the apparently substantive rights in Article 8
included an implicit procedural right to information was a significant,
expansionist reading of Article 8. Yet the Court provided no analysis as to why
this was so. It simply said that Article 8 did so. In taking this step, the Court
opened the door to the future recognition of other procedural rights (such as
public participation and conceivably access to justice) as part of Article 8.
Guerra was the first step in what has become an ever-broadening interpretation
of Article 8 to support procedural rights. Other cases were to follow.
b. Duties of EIA and Access to Justice: Taşkin v. Turkey (2004)
The Court returned to the issue of a right to information being implicit in
184
Article 8 in Taşkin v. Turkey. It was one of a long-running series of cases
involving cyanide heap-leach gold mining. Residents near a mine operated by
Eurogold argued that the cyanide posed a significant risk to flora, fauna,
185
underground water sources, and human health. The Court sidestepped the
question whether the mine created a substantive violation of Article 8 on the
ground that the permit for the mine had been annulled in other litigation by
186
Turkey’s Supreme Administrative Court. Despite various court rulings, the
187
Government of Turkey proceeded to issue permits and approvals, leading to the
case brought before the ECHR.

181. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6, at art. 10(1).
182. Guerra, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 226. Since the time of Guerra, the nations of Europe have imposed
widespread duties on their governments to make positive disclosures of information—for example, in the Kiev
Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers. Kiev Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer
Registers, UNECE, http://www.unece.org/env/pp/prtr.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2012).
183. Guerra, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 244.
184. Taşkin v. Turkey, 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 179.
185. Id. at 189.
186. Id. at 206.
187. Id. at 192-98.
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The Court found that Article 8’s right to respect for private and family life
requires that a decision-making process be “fair” and afford “due respect” to the
interests safeguarded by Article 8, even though “Article 8 contains no explicit
188
procedural requirements.” The Court then put content into the concept of
fairness and due respect by requiring that, before making an environmental
policy decision, “the decision-making process must firstly involve appropriate
investigations and studies” so that the government can “predict and evaluate in
advance the effects of those activities which might damage the environment and
189
infringe individual’s rights.” It sounds as if the process of environmental
impact assessment (“EIA”), which is normally used to evaluate the effects of
potential activities in advance, is a necessary prerequisite for any decisionmaking to comply with Article 8.
Nor can an EIA be done in secret. The Court went further and, citing Guerra
v. Italy, required that the public have “access to the conclusions of such studies
and to information which would enable members of the public to assess the
190
danger to which they are exposed”; this importance “is beyond question.”
Finally, the Court made access to justice mandatory. Individuals concerned
“must also be able to appeal to the courts against any decision, act or omission
where they consider that their interests or their comments have not been given
191
sufficient weight in the decision-making process,” citing Hatton.
These are remarkably expansive interpretations of Article 8’s rather simply
stated guarantee of the right to private and family life. Two years later, as we will
see next, the Court continued its new discovery of procedural rights in Article 8.
c. Duties of EIA and to Suspend Activity: Giacomelli v. Italy (2006)
Having discovered a duty to investigate potential environmental impacts and
a duty to provide for access to justice in Article 8, the ECHR next insisted on
observance of national laws requiring a suspension of activities in the face of
negative impacts. In Giacomelli v. Italy, a homeowner complained of pollution
192
from a waste storage and treatment plant about thirty meters from her home.
The regional authorities had granted permission to operate the plant and increase
the quantity of waste processed there without conducting a required EIA to
193
ensure the plant’s compliance with Italy’s environmental laws. Eventually,
when the plant operator applied for relicensing five years later, an EIA was
194
conducted (seven years after the plant began operation). Even though the EIA
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
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Id. at 206-07.
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Id.; Hatton v. United Kingdom, 2003-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 191.
Giacomelli v. Italy, 2006-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 345.
Id.
Id.
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indicated that the plant was in violation of two different Italian environmental
laws, however, the authorities did not suspend operation of the plant as required
195
by law and by rulings of the Italian courts in the matter. The ECHR held that
the State’s conduct violated Article 8 because the administrative authorities
deprived the homeowner of her procedural rights by failing to complete an EIA
in the first instance and violated the principle of the rule of law by failing to
suspend the plant’s operation when the EIA was eventually completed and
196
negative consequences were shown.
The expansion of Article 8 in both Taşkin and Giacomelli to encompass a
duty to complete an EIA is a remarkable development. It may have limited effect
in the states of the European Union, where EIAs have become relatively routine.
However, it could have more bite in Eastern Europe. For example, in 2011
Ukraine adopted a new Law on Urban Building Activity, which eliminates public
197
participation in EIA procedures for most projects. One might speculate about
whether a challenge to that repeal of EIA requirements could successfully be
brought in the national courts of Ukraine, based on Taşkin and Giacomelli and
eventually in the ECHR.
d. Duty to Use the Precautionary Principle in Providing Information:
Tătar v. Romania (2009)
In another case of alleged procedural shortcomings by the State, the Court
198
explicitly used the precautionary principle for the first time. Tătar v. Romania
199
concerned the Baia Mara gold mine. In 2000, a dam holding back cyanideladen water collapsed, leading to widespread pollution of places in Romania,
200
Hungary, and Serbia-Montenegro. A man and his son complained that elevated
levels of cyanide fumes had aggravated the son’s asthma. Regarding this
complaint, the Court said that “no causal link” had been proved “between
195. Id.
196. Id. at 365-67.
197. Закон Українип ро регулювання містобудівної діяльності, [The Law of Ukraine on Regulation
of Urban Development], 3395-VI art. 21 (May 19, 2011) (Ukr.), available at http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgibin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=3038-17.
198. The Court refused to use the precautionary principle in Balmer-Schafroth v. Switzerland, where it
denied relief to applicants objecting to a nuclear power plant operating nearby. The Court said that to show a
violation of Article 8 it was necessary to demonstrate “serious but also specific and, above all, imminent”
personal danger. This drew the fire of eight dissenting judges. See dissenting opinion of Judge Pettiti. BalmerSchafroth v. Switzerland, 1997-IV 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1346, 1361. It refused again in Asselbourg v. Luxembourg,
1999-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 399.
199. Tătar v. Romania, App. No. 67021/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 69 (Jan. 27, 2009), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search Tătar v. Romania under Case Title).
Starting in 2007, some of the hearings of the European Court of Human Rights are available by webcast. In this
case, the hearing is available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Press/Multimedia/Webcasts+
of+public+hearings/.
200. Id. at para. 111.
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sufficient exposure to certain doses of sodium cyanide and aggravation of
201
202
asthma.” Therefore it made no award of pecuniary damages.
The Court went on, however, to assess whether Romania had a duty to warn
the public of potential adverse effects of the cyanide leaching process and other
problems, whether it had complied with that duty, and whether the public had
adequate information that would allow it to participate in decision-making
concerning the proposal. It noted that “le principe de précaution” (the
precautionary principle) recommends that States not delay taking preventive
203
action simply because of scientific uncertainty. The Court held that Romania
should have addressed in advance the potential risk of the mine on the
environment and the health of the population. However, the Court made no
award of compensation. With regard to moral (non-pecuniary) damage, it simply
204
refused to make an award, without any explanation whatsoever.
C. Article 2—Right to Life
While most of the jurisprudence of the ECHR has involved Article 8, in
some instances the Court has decided to invoke Article 2, which guarantees a
right to life.
1. Side-stepping the Issue: Guerra (1998) and LCB (1999)
In Guerra v. Italy, the Court toyed with Article 2, but ultimately (over the
205
objection of two judges) chose to rely only on Article 8. In a concurring
opinion in Guerra, however, Judge Walsh wrote that while “the Court in its
judgment has briefly mentioned Article 2, but has not ruled on it, I am of the
206
opinion that this provision has also been violated.” Moreover, Judge Jambrek
wrote in his concurring opinion in Guerra that protection of health and physical
integrity is as closely associated with the “right to life” as with the “respect for
private and family life.” He also wrote:
If information is withheld by a government about circumstances which
foreseeably, and on substantial grounds, present a real risk of danger to
health and physical integrity, then such a situation may also be protected

201. “La Cour constate donc que les requérants n’ont pas réussi à prouver l’existence d’un lien de
causalité suffisamment établi entre l’exposition à certaines doses de cyanure de sodium et l’aggravation de
l’asthme.” Id. at para. 106.
202. Id. at para. 131.
203. Id. at para. 109.
204. Id. at paras. 107, 132.
205. See discussion supra in text at notes 57-73.
206. Guerra v. Italy, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 210, 232 (Walsh, J., concurring).
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by Article 2 of the Convention: “No one shall be deprived of his life
intentionally.”
It may therefore be time for the Court’s case law on Article 2 (the right
to life) to start evolving, to develop the respective implied rights,
articulate situations of real and serious risk to life, or different aspects of
207
the right to life.
That time came soon thereafter. In a case decided in 1999, the Court refused
to find a violation of the right to life in Article 2 as a result of a member of the
208
Royal Air Force being exposed to radiation during open-air nuclear testing. The
Court based its decision on a finding that the government of the United Kingdom
had done all that it could to avoid a risk to life. In cases decided in 2004 and
2008, however, the Court found that it could no longer sidestep the use of Article
2, at least in dramatic situations where actual loss of life had occurred.
2. Actual Loss of Life: Öneryildiz v. Turkey (2004)
The first occasion for recognition of Article 2’s right to life in an
209
environmental context came in the case Öneryildiz v. Turkey. The applicant
lived with twelve close relatives in the slum quarter Kazım Karabekir, a district
of Istanbul. “Since the early 1970s, a household-refuse tip had been in operation”
210
in that slum area. Situated on a slope, the refuse site “spread out over a surface
area of approximately 35 hectares and . . . was used as a rubbish tip” by several
districts “under the authority and responsibility of the city council and . . . the
ministerial authorities. When the rubbish tip started being used, the area was
211
uninhabited and the closest built-up area was approximately 3.5 km away.”
However, later dwellings “were built without any authorisation in the area
surrounding the rubbish tip, which eventually developed into the slums of
212
Ümraniye.”
According to an experts’ report dated May 7, 1991, “the rubbish tip in
question did not conform to the technical requirements” set forth in the
applicable regulations and presented a danger and “a major health risk for the
213
inhabitants of the valley, particularly those living in the slum areas.” The
Report emphasized that:

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 234 (Jambrek, J., concurring).
LCB v. United Kingdom, App. No. 23413/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 41 (June 9, 1998).
Öneryildiz v Turkey, 2004-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 79.
Id. at 89.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 91.
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In any waste-collection site gases such as methane, carbon dioxide and
hydrogen sulphide form. These substances must be collected and . . .
burnt under supervision. However, the tip in question is not equipped
with such a system. If methane is mixed with air in a particular
proportion, it can explode. This installation contains no means of
preventing an explosion of the methane produced as a result of the
214
decomposition [of the waste].
“The report was brought to the attention of the four councils,” and later the
governor was “asked to brief the Ministry of Health and the Prime Minister’s
215
Environment Office.” The Environment Office made a recommendation
“urging the Istanbul Governor’s Office, the city council and Ümraniye District
216
Council to remedy the problems identified in the present case.” While different
governmental agencies discussed the problem back and forth, Ümraniye District
Council informed the mayor of Istanbul that starting May 15, 1993, the dumping
217
of waste would no longer be authorized.
On April 28, 1993, “a methane explosion occurred at the site. Following a
landslide caused by mounting pressure, the refuse erupted from the mountain of
waste and engulfed some ten slum dwellings situated below it, including the one
218
belonging to the applicant. Thirty-nine people died in the accident.” “The
applicant complained that the death of nine of his close relatives in the accident
219
. . . had constituted a violation of Article 2 of the [European] Convention;” that
Article provides as follows:
Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be
deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a
court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is
220
provided by law.
The Court recognized that the protection of the right to life “could be relied
on in connection with the operation of the waste-collection sites” and held a
positive obligation was binding on “States to take appropriate steps to safeguard
221
the lives of those within their jurisdiction, for the purposes of Article 2.”
Therefore the Court held “unanimously “that there ha[d] been a violation of
Article 2 of the Convention in its substantive aspect, on account of the lack of

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

278

Id.
Id.
Id. at 92.
Id.
Id. at 92-93.
Id. at 108.
European Convention, supra note 18, at art. 2.
Öneryildiz v Turkey, 2004-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 109.
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appropriate steps to prevent the accidental death of nine of the applicant’s close
222
relatives.”
The Court also continued its efforts to embed an information right in
provisions of the Convention other than Article 10. Referring back to the
Resolution adopted by the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly in the
wake of the Chernobyl disaster, the Court said:
Where such dangerous activities are concerned, public access to clear
and full information is viewed as a basic human right; for example, the
above-mentioned Resolution 1087 (1996) makes clear that this right
must not be taken to be limited to the risks associated with the use of
223
nuclear energy in the civil sector.
Öneryildiz found a new locus for the “basic human right” to clear and full
information. In addition to the previous recognition of the right as part of Article
8, the Court now said that a right to information should be considered an element
of Article 2, which guarantees the right to life:
[T]his right, which has already been recognised under Article 8 (see
Guerra and Others, cited above, p.228, § 60), may also, in principle, be
relied on for the protection of the right to life, particularly as this
interpretation is supported by current developments in European
224
standards.
The Court concluded that the applicant’s right to information had been
225
ignored, and thus Article 2 had been violated.
3. More Loss of Life: Budayeva v. Russia (2008)
226

The Court returned to the invocation of Article 2 in Budayeva v. Russia.
Although that case did not involve environmental dangers, it did show that the
Court was serious about insisting that governments have a duty not to leave
citizens exposed to serious harm. Ms. Khalimat Budayeva and the other
applicants involved in the case lived in the town of Tyrnauz, in Russia, next to
Mount Elbrus. The region is prone to mudslides—they have been recorded every

222. Id. at 145-46.
223. Id. at 108.
224. Id. at 115 (referring to the Court’s previous citation to the Parliamentary Assembly’s Resolution
No. 1087, cited earlier in the case in ¶ 62).
225. Id. at 121-22.
226. Budayeva v. Russia, Apps. No. 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02 & 15343/02, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (Mar. 20, 2008), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search
Budayeva v. Russia under Case Title).
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year since 1937. The applicants alleged that in July 2000 the Russian
authorities had failed to warn the local population about the likelihood of a largescale, imminent mudslide that eventually devastated Tyrnauz and had not
implemented evacuation and emergency relief policies. In July 2000, a flow of
228
mud and debris hit the town of Tyrnauz and flooded part of the residential area.
Because there was no advance warning, the applicants only just managed to
229
escape. After the mudslide happened, an alarm was raised over loudspeakers,
but the applicants claimed that there were no rescue forces or any other
230
emergency relief after the disaster. The next morning the mud level fell; certain
residents, among them Khalimat Budayeva and her family, returned to their
homes because there were no signs of emergency relief or order of evacuation
from their government. However, a second, more powerful mudslide hit the town
at 1 p.m., later that day. Ms. Budayeva and her eldest son managed to escape.
Her younger son was rescued, but was seriously injured. Her husband, Vladimir
Budayev, was killed when the block of flats in which he and his family lived
collapsed. Eight people were officially reported dead, although the applicants
231
alleged that nineteen people were missing. All the applicants claimed that their
homes were destroyed and that their living conditions and health had deteriorated
232
because of the disaster.
Relying on Articles 2 (right to life) and 8 (right to respect for private and
family life), the applicants alleged that, as a result of the Russian authorities’
failure to mitigate the consequences of the mudslides of July 2000, the authorities
put the applicants’ lives at risk and were responsible for the death of Mr.
Budayev and the destruction of all the applicants’ homes. They also complained
under Article 2 that the authorities failed to carry out a judicial enquiry into the
disaster. The Court found a violation of Article 2 and decided that it was
233
therefore not necessary to examine Article 8.
4. Is Article 2 Relevant?
The Öneryildiz and Budayeva cases could be seen as restricted to their
facts—people were allowed to live in dangerous areas despite clear knowledge
possessed by the government that such dangers existed and actual deaths
occurred. Will the Court be willing to use Article 2 in a situation of great risk
where no life has yet been lost? Guerra suggests that it may not do so if Article 8
can be pressed into service.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
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Id. at paras. 7, 14.
Id. at paras. 3, 25-26.
Id. at para. 55.
Id. at para. 28.
Id. at paras. 33, 41, 44.
Id. at paras. 52, 62, 70, 88.
Id. at paras. 3, 142, 201.
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Situations may arise, however, in which “private and family life” are not
impacted, yet high risk to life exists. It seems logical to these authors that Article
2 should be available in such cases.
II. EMBEDDING ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS DECISIONS IN NATIONAL LAW AND
COURT PRACTICE
The cases discussed in this article reveal several things. First, the Court is
unwilling to order specific actions that would mitigate damage to the
environment. Instead, it satisfies itself with small awards of compensation or
even no compensation at all, but just a statement that the European Convention
has been violated. This reliance on the good faith of officials, the great solicitude
for national sovereignty, or a combination of both verges on naiveté. But it seems
unlikely that this will change. As a result, to see any real impact of the Court’s
decisions, one must look to another enforcer: national courts.
It is striking that several national courts have, at least initially, refrained from
granting remedies under provisions of their national constitutions that are almost
234
identical to Article 8, Section 2 of the European Convention. The result is that
citizens can achieve their relief only in the ECHR. As a consequence, the Court
235
has a backlog of thousands of cases. As another consequence, the doctrines
enunciated by the Court are not being integrated into the rule of law of the
countries that are members of the Council of Europe. On the other hand, the legal
systems of some countries have thoroughly embraced the European Convention
and the interpretations of the Convention made by the ECHR in its case
decisions, as shown below.
A. Applicability of the Convention in Domestic Law
In some countries, the Convention is directly applicable. That is, those
countries’ national courts apply the European Convention in the same way as
236
they apply their own national constitution and laws. In the United Kingdom, for
example, the Human Rights Act 1998 gives the Convention direct effect in
237
domestic law. In Ukraine, the Convention’s direct effect is stated in the

234. See, e.g., Fadeyeva v. Russia, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 257, 284; López Ostra v. Spain, 303 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 41, 56.
235. The Council of Europe has announced plans to streamline procedures at the European Court of
Human Rights to help deal with a backlog of 120,000 cases. See Mammoth Backlog Prompts European Rights
Court Reforms, BBC NEWS (Feb. 19, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/mobile/europe/8525524.stm.
236. A survey of the variety of statuses of the European Convention in domestic legal systems of Europe
is provided in Georg Ress, The Effect of Decisions and Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in
the Domestic Legal Order, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 359 (2005).
237. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 4 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
1998/42/contents.
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national Constitution. By itself, this would simply provide another source of
law for national courts to use. What is more interesting is this question: what
relevance does the jurisprudence of the ECHR have in national courts? This we
shall discuss next.
B. Use of ECHR Precedents
Do the judgments issued by the ECHR, which is located in Strasbourg, have
any impact as precedents back in the country where the dispute arose or, indeed,
in other countries that are members of the Council of Europe? Some countries
use the jurisprudence of the ECHR as legally binding precedent; others simply
239
show respect and deference to it.
In most legal systems of Western Europe, decisions of the ECHR not only
constitute legal obligations for the country concerned, but are also at least
persuasive authority for other members of the Council of Europe. As a
consequence, the jurisprudence of the ECHR should be central to the question
whether environmental harms have a human rights dimension in Western
European countries.
As an example, the Constitutional Court of Spain has been receptive to both
the European Convention and the decisions of the ECHR. This receptivity may
manifest itself simply as the Constitutional Court viewing the European
Convention and the ECHR decisions as supportive, rather than determinative, of
a legal result that it is inclined to reach. For example, in the 2004 decision in the
case of Manuel Jiménez de Parga y Cabrera, the First Chamber of the
Constitutional Court rejected a case brought by a pub owner who had been fined
240
for noise pollution. The pub owner questioned the right of the Mayor of the
City of Gijón to impose the fine under a municipal law. The Court replied that
the municipal law was justified by, among other things, Spain’s law on
atmospheric pollution (which the Court said could include noise), the right to
personal privacy and family life enshrined in Article 18.1 of the Constitution of
241
Spain, and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

238. “International treaties that are in force, agreed to be binding by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, are
part of the national legislation of Ukraine.” КОНСТИТУЦІЯ УКРАЇНИ [CONSTITUTION] June 28, 1996, art. 9
(Ukr.), available at http://www.rada.gov.ua/const/conengl.htm.
239. An interesting, recent article attempts to assess the degree to which decisions of the European Court
of Human Rights have an impact on domestic legal and policy decisions. Laurence R. Helfer & Erik Voeten, Do
European Court of Human Rights Judgments Promote Legal and Policy Change? (Working Paper, 2011),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1850526. A handbook published by the
Directorate General of Human Rights of the Council of Europe in 2001 stated without equivocation that “judges
must assess the Convention complaint before them by applying the principles which are found in the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights . . . .” KILKELLY, supra note 16, at 5. The lack of
equivocation in that statement may oversimplify the reality in some legal systems.
240. S.T.S., Feb. 23, 2004 (S.T.C. No. 16/2004) pt. I, sec. 2(b) (Spain) (on file with authors).
241. Id. at pt. II sec. 3.
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Furthermore, the Court cited López Ostra and Guerra in support of its decision
242
upholding the municipal law.
Such views have also penetrated the domestic jurisprudence of Spain widely.
For example, in a 2010 case, the Superior Court of Justice of the Murcia Region
said:
Thus, in S.92/01 of February 21, we said that “the fundamental right to
personal and family privacy and the inviolability of the home according
to the judgments cited by the plaintiffs, including the European Court of
Human Rights, presupposes respect for a wide range of guarantees and
powers, which includes barring all types of invasion at home, not just
those involving direct physical penetration, but also can be indirectly by
mechanical, electronic or similar, producing noise and even through the
emission of odors which disturb the privacy of the people in that room
that is his home, which should be exempt and immune to invasions or
attacks other external persons or authorities (STC 22/1984, of 17-2 (RTC
243
1984 \ 22)).
A similar approach is taken in Russia. A resolution (Постановление,
postanovleniia) issued by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation in
October 2003 states:
The Russian Federation, as a Member-State of the Convention on
Protection of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms recognises the
jurisdiction of the European Court on Human Rights as mandatory with
respect to interpretation and application of the Convention and Protocols
thereof in the event of an assumed breach by the Russian Federation of
provisions of these treaty acts when the assumed breach has taken place
after their entry into force in respect to the Russian Federation. . . .
[Therefore] the application by courts of the said Convention should take
into account the practice of the European Court on Human Rights to
avoid any violation of the Convention on Human Rights and Basic
244
Freedoms.

242. Id.
243. T.S.J. Oct. 25, 2010 (R.J.C.A. 898/10, ¶ Segundo) (Spain), available at http://www.aranzadi.es/
index.php/informacion-juridica/jurisprudencia/contencioso-administrativo/sentencia-del-tribunal-superior-dejusticia-region-de-murcia-de-25-octubre-2010 (Google translation, modified by author).
244.
Resolution “On application by courts of general jurisdiction of the commonly recognized
principles and norms of the international law and the international treaties of the Russian Federation,”
Rasporiazheniia Бюллетень № 12 sec. 10 [Resolution Adopted by the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the
Russian Federation No. 5] Oct. 10, 2003, available at http://www.supcourt.ru/catalog.php?c1=
English&c2=Documents&c3=&id=6801 (English). We have quoted the English translation that is presented on
the website of the Russian Supreme Court. The original resolution in Russian is, “О применении судами
общей юрисдикции общепризнанных принципов и норм международного права и международных
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. . . The courts within their scope of competence should act so as to
ensure the implementation of obligations of the State stemming from the
245
participation of the Russian Federation in the Convention. . . .
Furthermore, a December 2003 resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme
Court states explicitly that courts should consider not only decisions of the
Constitutional Court of Russia and summary resolutions of the Plenum of the
Supreme Court but also decisions of the ECHR when provisions of the European
246
Convention are to be applied in a case. A law professor and head of the Civil
Law Department of St. Petersburg University, Russia, who has also sat as an ad
hoc member of the ECHR, points out that this provision is not limited to
jurisprudence from ECHR cases involving Russia: “Russian courts should be
mindful of the European Court’s [judgments] construing the norms of the
Convention as applied in the case in question. This is regardless whether the
European Court’s [judgments] were issued in relation to Russia or other country
247
[sic].” He buttresses this view by citing to decisions of the Constitutional Court
of Russia that have, in fact, made reference to ECHR judgments in cases
248
involving Belgium, Greece, and Romania.
Courts throughout the Russian judiciary are citing ECHR decisions as part of
the basis for their decisions. As long ago as 1995, the Plenum of the Russian
Supreme Court issued a resolution stating that external sources of law (including
international treaties) should be used by the courts and that legislation conflicting
249
with those external sources should be ignored. The later resolution of the

договоров Российской Федерации,” Rasporiazheniia Бюллетень № 12 [Resolution Adopted by the Plenum
of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 5] Oct. 10, 2003, available at http://www.supcourt.
ru/vscourt_detale.php?id=1961 (Russian).
245. Id. at sec. 11. In addition, the Supreme Court Resolution provides:
If the court in hearing a case has established the circumstances that contributed to the violation of
the rights and liberties of citizens guaranteed by the Convention, the court has the right to issue its
ruling (or decision) which would draw attention of relevant organisations and officials to the
circumstances and facts of violation of the rights and liberties requiring that necessary measures be
taken.
Id. In the hands of a creative and brave Russian judge, this authority could conceivably lead to injunctive-type
actions beyond the mere individual compensation ordered by the ECHR. For a discussion of this provision, see
Valeriy A. Musin, Recent Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights: An Overview, 35 INT’L J. LEGAL
INFO. 262 (2007).
246. Постановление Пленума Верховного Суда Российской Федерации № 23 [Resolution of the
Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 23] Res. No. 23, Dec. 19, 2003, para. 4 (Russ.),
available at http://www.supcourt.ru/vscourt_detale.php?id=4729.
247. Musin, supra note 245, at 263.
248. Id. at 264.
249. Rasporiazheniia О некоторых вопросах применения судами Конституции Российской
Федерации при осуществлении правосудия [Resolution On Certain Questions of the Courts’ Application of
the Russian Federation Constitution in the Administration of Justice] Res. No. 8, Oct. 31, 1995, available at
http://www.supcourt.ru/vscourt_detale.php?id=3863.
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250

Supreme Court, dated December 19, 2003, did increase the attention paid by
courts not just to international treaties, but to the decisions of the ECHR
interpreting the European Convention. For example, one scholar has looked at a
number of lower court decisions in defamation cases in Russia and observed an
increasing practice in the lower courts of citing ECHR interpretations of Article
251
10 of the European Convention.
In Ukraine, Article 9 of the Constitution of Ukraine gives all international
252
treaties ratified by Ukraine the status of national law. Furthermore, countries
that ratify the European Convention are obligated to accept the jurisdiction of the
253
ECHR and to abide by its judgments in cases to which the country is a party.
For example, the Parliament of Ukraine ratified the European Convention on July
254
17, 1997, and it thereby accepted the jurisdiction of the ECHR.
The question of the precedential effect of ECHR rulings is also still an open
one in Ukraine. In 2006, Ukraine’s parliament adopted the Law of Ukraine on the
Enforcement of Judgments and the Application of the Case-Law of the European
Court of Human Rights, which states, “In cases, courts apply the Convention and
255
[the practice of the European] Court as legal authority.” Does this law mean
what it says? If it does, is it constitutional in Ukraine? The Ukraine Parliament
Commissioner for Human Rights (also known as the human rights ombudsman)
has questioned whether this provision of Ukrainian law really obliges Ukrainian
courts to follow the decisions of the ECHR as precedents for their own decisions.
256
She wrote in a 2010 report:
Systemic analysis of Ukraine’s Constitution, in particular, of its Articles
8, 9, 92, 93 etc., gives grounds to a conclusion that the Constitution does

250. See supra note 244.
251. Peter Krug, Internalizing European Court of Human Rights Interpretations: Russia’s Courts of
General Jurisdiction and New Directions in Civil Defamation Law, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1 (2006).
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not envisage the judicial precedent to be a source of law in Ukraine. For
this reason the role of the judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights are sometimes put under question when it [sic] goes about the
application of certain provisions of the Convention by Ukraine’s
257
courts.
How strong is this argument? In reality, the courts of Ukraine regularly cite
to the decisions of the ECHR in their own decisions. They appear to do so,
however, primarily when the ECHR decision is in line with the court’s own view
258
of Ukrainian national legislation. What if they disagree with the ECHR?
Considering the various cases decided under Article 8 cited earlier in this article,
might high-level Ukrainian courts reject the view adopted by the ECHR that
environmental harm can be an invasion of the right of private and family life? If
they were to do so, a person suffering harm from environmental pollution might
be unable to obtain a remedy from the Ukrainian courts while still being able to
obtain a remedy from the ECHR. What would that do to the doctrine under which
complainants are expected first to exhaust national remedies before approaching
the ECHR? Such attempts would appear to be in vain. Presumably, the ECHR
would have to rule that environmental litigants have no obligation to pursue
useless remedies. That, however, would run contrary to the whole purpose of the
exhaustion doctrine under the Convention, which is, in part, presumably meant to
suffuse the legal systems of nations that are parties to the European Convention
with the human rights norms contained therein.
The Ukrainian Commissioner suggests a different manner for incorporating
European human rights norms into the practice of Ukrainian courts, namely to
259
educate judges about the European Convention. However, if Ukrainian judges
are free to formulate their own interpretations of Article 8, interpretations which
may exclude remedy for environmental harm, an education program is hardly a
sufficient answer. The European Commissioner for Human Rights appears to
have a different approach. In a 2008 report, he recommended that each country
should undertake a baseline study that focuses on recurring or structural
problems. Among the recommendations for conducting such a study was this:
“Evaluate efforts to provide human rights education. Many governments are not
giving enough attention and resources to ensure that people know their rights and
260
understand how to claim them.” In other words, while the Ukrainian
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Commissioner is saying that judges should be educated on the European
Convention, the European Commissioner is saying that the people should be
educated on how to “claim” their rights under the European Convention. Of
course there are two ways of claiming one’s rights: to insist upon them in
encounters with government officials and to insist upon them in court cases. But
if the Ukrainian courts will refuse to recognize ECHR precedents as a matter of
national jurisprudence, educating citizens seems a massive waste of time.
III. CONCLUSIONS: A CALL FOR STRATEGIC LITIGATION
Might more comprehensive remedies be available in national courts? If so,
would it be possible for a litigant in a national court to use an ECHR ruling on a
violation of Article 8 to ask a national court to grant a more sweeping remedy
than what the ECHR ordered, such as an injunction to clean up the steel plant or
to resettle residents? If the Russian Federation ignores ECHR precedents and
compensation rulings, what can a complainant do? Does it matter whether the
European Convention has direct application within a nation’s legal system? If
direct application is possible, will that provide hope for future applicants that
they could achieve a domestic remedy after an ECHR ruling?
Although it has been suggested that a way of incorporating the ECHR’s
interpretation of human rights into national law is education of judges, the
authors believe strategic litigation can accomplish education as well as
incorporation more effectively. One way that judges can be educated about the
European Convention would be by having lawyers bring cases to the national
courts that allege violations of the Convention—including asking the courts to
respect the interpretations of the European Convention stated authoritatively by
the ECHR. In this regard, strategic litigation might be more successful than
training disconnected from specific cases.
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